Abstract: Recent changes in real estate law hastened the shift from a seller's agency regime, in which real estate agents serve the interests of sellers, to a buyer's agency regime, in which agents serve the interests of buyers. We develop a theoretical model that shows that real estate prices and the time needed to sell a house can either rise or fall after a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency. Using data from the Atlanta real estate market, we show that the shift to buyer's agency led to a significant decline in real estate prices in the market for relatively expensive houses, while real estate prices did not significantly change in the market for relatively inexpensive homes. In both markets, the average time needed to sell a house fell after the change in agency regimes. These results are consistent with a conclusion that a shift to buyer's agency improves the efficiency of the search process.
Introduction
In 1993, Edina Realty, Inc., a Minnesota-based real estate broker, lost two class action lawsuits brought by former clients. At issue in these cases, which together cost Edina more than $18.2 million, was the question of whether Edina had adequately informed its clients of the nature of their agency relationships with the firm.
These cases were a wake-up call to the real estate brokerage industry in the United States, which immediately recognized its vulnerability to large judgments in litigation arising from confusion over the nature of real estate agency relationships. Subsequent pressure from the real estate brokerage industry served as the catalyst for legal reforms in many individual states. Broadly speaking, these new laws clarify the duties that real estate agents owe to buyers and sellers in each of the different possible agency relationships and thus provide some protection from litigation to the real estate brokerage industry.
In this paper, we analyze how the real estate market responded to the changes in Georgia's real estate law that took effect in the wake of the lawsuits against Edina Realty. The new Georgia law clarifies real estate agents' duties to their clients and requires agents to disclose the full range of available agency relationships to potential buyers. We argue below that these changes in Georgia's law, particularly the disclosure provision, hastened the shift from the traditional seller's agency regime, in which all real estate agents serve the interests of sellers, to a buyer's agency regime, in which buyers hire agents who protect and promote their interests.
The nature of the prevailing agency relationship has an important effect on what sellers know about the potential buyers that they meet. Under seller's agency, a real estate agent usually has a legal obligation to report what he knows about a potential buyer to the seller. The seller can then use this information to her advantage during subsequent bargaining. Under buyer's agency, on the other hand, an agent who works for a buyer has a duty to keep what he knows about his client confidential. Therefore, a switch to buyer's agency should curb the flow of information from buyers to sellers and may increase the buyers' bargaining power by depriving the sellers of valuable information about potential buyers. But then the effect of a legal change that causes a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency may seem obvious. If buyers have more bargaining power under buyer's agency, they should be able to capture a larger share of the gains from trade, and the price of real estate should fall after a legal reform that promotes buyer's agency.
We believe that this simple intuition fails to recognize all of the possible effects of a change in agency relationships in the real estate market or, more generally, in any search market. We observe that the prevailing agency relationship in a search market effectively determines who has a property right over the information that a buyer reveals to his agent. Under seller's agency, the seller has a property right over this information; under buyer's agency, the buyer holds the property right. Of course, the Coase Theorem establishes that, in the absence of transaction costs, the distribution of property rights affects only the distribution, and not the size, of the total surplus generated by economic activity. But transaction costs are not zero in search markets, and, therefore, the distribution of property rights over information may influence allocative efficiency.
In any search market in which agents operate, allocative efficiency depends on the agents' ability to match buyers and sellers in the way that optimally balances two competing goals: minimizing search costs and maximizing the aggregate gains from trade. While there is no a priori reason to believe that agents approach this tradeoff in the socially optimal way, it is reasonable to believe that allocative efficiency improves when buyers reveal more information to their agents. If an agent is familiar with a buyer's preferences, she can more effectively identify matches that generate large expected gains from trade. With more information about a buyer's willingness to pay, the agent can also more easily identify bargaining situations in which there are no gains from trade. The agent may be able to use this information to prevent buyers and sellers from wasting time in fruitless haggling and thereby reduce search costs.
But a buyer's incentive to reveal information to his agent depends on the distribution of property rights over that information. If the seller holds the property right, the buyer faces a conflict when deciding how much information to reveal to his agent. By revealing more information, the buyer both helps his agent to match him with the best possible trading partner and strengthens the seller's position during subsequent bargaining. If the buyer holds the property right, on the other hand, the buyer faces no such tradeoff, because he does not worry that the seller will learn what the buyer's agent knows. We conclude that a buyer would reveal more information to his agent in a buyer's agency regime, possibly improving the efficiency of the matching process.
In order to analyze these issues, we develop a stylized model of the housing market in which the prevailing agency relationship influences the flow of information from buyers to sellers. Each seller meets a stream of buyers who have private information about their willingness to pay. Under seller's agency, a real estate agent may communicate information about a buyer's willingness to pay to the seller. In this case, the seller's optimal reservation price in each meeting with a potential buyer depends on what she knows about that particular buyer's willingness to pay. Under buyer's agency, on the other hand, the seller receives no information about the buyer's willingness to pay. Therefore, she chooses the same reservation price in each meeting with a potential buyer.
A shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency has competing effects on the market price of housing. On the one hand, a switch to buyer's agency should increase buyers' bargaining power, putting downward pressure on the price of housing. On the other hand, however, a switch to buyer's agency may lead buyers to reveal more information to their agents, improving their ability to find houses that their clients are willing and able to buy.
From the sellers' points of view, this effect improves the distribution of buyers that they face, leading them to increase their reservation prices and putting upward pressure on the price of housing. Thus, a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency could either increase or decrease the price of housing, depending on which of these two effects is greater.
A shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency may also affect search costs by influencing the probability that each meeting between a buyer and a seller results in a transaction. If a switch to buyer's agency deprives sellers of information about buyers' willingness to pay, the probability that each match results in a transaction may fall.
Intuitively, sellers who are well informed about buyer valuations behave like price-discriminating monopolists, and they are more likely to trade in each period than sellers who have little information about buyer valuations.
On the other hand, if sellers face a better distribution of buyers after a switch to buyer's agency, the probability that each match results in a transaction may rise. Intuitively, sellers face a tradeoff between choosing a high price and obtaining a quick sale. When the distribution of buyers that sellers face improves, they choose to mute the increase in the prices that they demand in order to sell their houses faster. Given these countervailing forces, the average time needed to sell a house could either rise or fall after a shift to buyer's agency.
Because of the competing effects that we identify, the theoretical model cannot unambiguously predict whether the switch to buyer's agency will cause the price of housing and the average time needed to sell a house to rise or fall. Therefore, we also empirically analyze how the change in Georgia's law influenced the housing market in Atlanta. Our empirical results generally indicate that prices fell after the change in Georgia's law, though the effect was far more pronounced in the market for relatively expensive homes. This finding is consistent with a conclusion that the legal change-and the ensuing shift to buyer's agency-did deprive sellers of significant information about buyer valuations. Our empirical results also strongly indicate that the average time needed to sell a house fell after the change in Georgia's law. This finding is evidence that the legal change improved efficiency by reducing search costs, and it is consistent with a conclusion that, under buyer's agency, real estate agents are better able to match buyers with houses that they like.
Our paper contributes to the literature on search models of the real estate market by analyzing the role of agents who facilitate trades between buyers and sellers. 
Recent Changes in Real Estate Agency Law
In the United States, real estate transactions typically involve four people: a seller of real property, a buyer, a listing agent who markets the seller's property, and a selling agent who brings together the buyer and the seller.
In the traditional seller's agency system, both the listing agent and the selling agent represent the interests of sellers. The listing agent's duty to the seller arises when these two parties execute a listing agreement that states what actions the agent will take to market the seller's property, such as listing the property with the Multiple Listing Service (MLS). The listing agent typically owes the seller the fiduciary duties of good faith, loyalty, reasonable care, diligence, disclosure, and accounting. In exchange for performing these duties the listing agent receives a commission from the sale of the property.
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The selling agent's duty to the seller, on the other hand, does not arise directly from a written agreement between the selling agent and the seller. Indeed, because the MLS provides a selling agent with access to homes represented by many different listing agents, a selling agent often never meets the owners of the homes that he or she shows to prospective buyers. Nevertheless, prior to recent legal changes the selling agent ordinarily owed the fiduciary duties described above to the seller in a transaction, including an obligation to share with the seller any information that the buyer reveals to the agent. Because of then existing MLS rules, a selling agent who used the MLS system automatically became a subagent of the listing agent and, therefore, an agent of the seller.
In recent years it has become more common for buyers to employ a buyers' agent in their search for a house, rather than a traditional selling agent. A recent survey by the National Association of Realtors reveals that in 1993 thirty percent of buyers used a buyer's agent. 7 Under buyer's agency the agent owes the fiduciary duties described above to the buyer rather than the seller, giving the agent the responsibility to work to advance the No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771 (Minn. Dist. Ct., June 17, 1993 .
9 Bokusky v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 3-92 CIV 223, 1993 WL 515827 (D. Minn. August 6, 1993 10 The five states and the year they changed the relevant laws are California (1988) , Alabama (1989 ), Rhode Island (1989 , Alaska (1990), and New York (1991) . See Brown, et. al. (1995) 
A Model of the Real Estate Market
In this section, we investigate how a change in the prevailing agency relationship from seller's agency to buyer's agency affects the equilibrium that arises in the real estate market. In every period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …}, real estate agents, whose behavior we do not explicitly model, introduce each prospective buyer to a prospective seller and vice versa. Thus, all market participants are matched in every period that they are in the market. We assume that the market is "thick," in the sense that real estate agents can match every buyer and seller with a new partner in every period they are in the market.
In order to simplify the model, we assume that sellers make take-it-or-leave-it offers that buyers either accept or reject. In each match between a buyer and a seller, the buyer's valuation of the seller's house is a random variable. The different buyers' valuations for the houses that their agents take them to see are independently and identically distributed. Define v t as a representative buyer's valuation of a seller's house in period t. In order to simplify the model, we assume initially that v t is distributed uniformly on the unit interval. It might seem reasonable to assume that a buyer is privately informed about his 13 In another paper, we analyze a strategic bargaining model in which sellers and potential buyers make alternating offers. Permitting this possibility did not change our main conclusions, because privately informed buyers did not signal their information in equilibrium. Intuitively, high valuation buyers always had an incentive to deviate to some offer made by lower valuation buyers in order to elicit a favorable counteroffer from the seller. In the present model, the sellers' offers can be interpreted as counteroffers to buyers' initial (uninformative) offers. Curran, Christopher and Joel Schrag. (1996) "Does it Matter Whom An Agent Serves? Evidence From Recent Changes in Real Estate Agency Law," mimeo, Emory University.
valuation for a particular house. In a seller's agency regime, however, a buyer's real estate agent can transmit information about his willingness-to-pay to the seller. Therefore, a seller may be able to learn about a particular buyer's valuation for her house. In order to model this possibility, we assume that, under seller's agency, in period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …} the seller observes the buyer's valuation v t with probability z ∈ [0, 1], while with complementary probability 1 -z the seller receives no information about v t . Under buyer's agency, on the other hand, a buyer's real estate agent has a legal obligation to keep confidential any information about the client's willingness to pay. Therefore, we assume that, under buyer's agency, the seller never observes v t .
Define B as the value of the representative buyer's program and S as the value of the representative seller's program at the beginning of a period, before the traders meet their bargaining partners. Our model is stationary through time, and therefore the values of the representative buyer's and seller's programs do not depend on the time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …}. 15 Define δ ∈ [0, 1) as the discount factor that is common to both the buyer and the seller. Because sellers make take-it-or-leave-it offers, a buyer will accept the first offer that yields him a surplus of at least δB, since this is the payoff that he anticipates receiving if he rejects an offer and proceeds to the next period. Thus, a buyer purchases a house in period t (and exits the market) if and only if v t -p t ≥ δB, where v t is the buyer's valuation of the house he sees in period t and p t is the price that the seller demands. For simplicity, we assume that the buyer accepts an offer if he is indifferent between accepting it and rejecting it.
The seller's pricing rule identifies the price that she proposes in period t as a function of what she knows about the buyer's valuation. Suppose that in period t the representative seller observes the buyer's valuation v t . If the seller wishes to trade with this buyer, she proposes a price p t = v t -δB, which leaves the buyer just willing to trade. If the seller does not wish to trade with this buyer, she proposes a price that the buyer will reject, i.e. p t > v t -δB. Alternatively, if the seller does not observe v t , she proposes a price p that is independent of the buyer's true valuation, and trade occurs in period t if v t ≥ p + δB.
15 Salant (1991) studies the effect of the non-stationarity that arises in the housing market due to buyers' preferences for concluding a deal before the school year starts in September. See note 3.
The seller's pricing rule can be summarized by the pair (v, p) , where v represents the valuation of the marginal buyer with whom the seller is just willing to trade when she observes v t , and p is the price that the seller proposes when she cannot observe the buyer's valuation. The seller chooses her strategy in order to maximize the value of her program S (v,p) , where:
Sellers typically must pay a commission to the real estate agent, which is not reflected in (1), but we assume that this commission is proportional to the selling price, as is typically the case. Under this assumption the seller wishes to maximize the total expected discounted income from the sale of her property, i.e. she wishes to maximize (1), even though she must pay a commission to the agent.
Given the seller's pricing rule, the value of the buyer's program B is:
We summarize the representative seller's optimal pricing rule in Proposition 1. 
A buyer accepts this price in period t if and only if v t ≥ p*(z) + δB. 16 The proof of Proposition 1 is located in the Appendix, along with the proofs of the other results.
Define P(z) as the expected price at which a representative seller sells her house, and define Q(z) as the probability that a transaction will occur in a given meeting between a buyer and a seller. The expected number of periods that a house will be on the market is Τ(z) = 1/Q(z). We have Proposition 2. PROPOSITION 2: (i) P(z) = p*(z). Furthermore, the expected price at which a representative seller sells her house is higher when sellers are more likely to observe buyers' valuations, i.e. dP/dz > 0.
Furthermore, a transaction is more likely to occur in a given meeting between a buyer and a seller when sellers are more likely to observe buyers' valuations, i.e. dQ/dz > 0. Therefore, the expected time that individual houses will remain on the market is lower when sellers are more likely to observe buyers' valuations, i.e. dΤ/dz < 0.
Proposition 2 establishes that sellers benefit in two ways when they have more information about buyers' valuations. First, the expected price at which they sell their houses increases. This result is not surprising; a seller who is better informed about a buyer's willingness to pay can more effectively capture the gains from trade. Second, sellers expect to sell their houses faster when they have more information about buyers' valuations. To see the intuition for this result, it is helpful to recognize that a seller who can observe buyers' valuations behaves like a price-discriminating monopolist. A price-discriminating monopolist typically sells more units than a monopolist who cannot observe buyers' willingness to pay, because he can sell to low valuation buyers without losing revenue on infra-marginal units. Analogously, a seller who is well-informed about buyers' valuations is more likely to trade in a given period than would be the case if she were uninformed, because she can trade with a low valuation buyer without worrying that she is possibly losing revenue from a high valuation buyer.
The comparative static results summarized in Proposition 2 yield straightforward predictions about the effects of a switch from seller's agency to buyer's agency. Because sellers receive less information about buyer valuations under buyer's agency-under buyer's agency z = 0, while under seller's agency z > 0-Proposition 2 yields the following predictions.
PREDICTION 1: All else equal, a switch from seller's agency to buyer's agency causes the expected price of housing to fall.
PREDICTION 2: All else equal, a switch from seller's agency to buyer's agency causes the expected time that houses will be on the market to rise.
These simple predictions about the effect of a move from seller's agency to buyer's agency rest on a key assumption, namely that, in each match between a buyer and a seller, the distribution of the buyer's valuation of the seller's house is the same under both agency regimes. But buyers may be more willing to reveal information about their preferences under a buyer's agency regime, since they could be confident that their agents would not divulge this information to sellers. If this additional information helps the agents to match the buyers with houses they like, the distribution of buyer valuations in each individual match may improve after a switch to buyer's agency.
In order to model this possibility, we suppose that, under buyer's agency, a buyer's valuation of a house that he sees is a random variable that is distributed on the unit interval according to the probability density function 
Meanwhile, the value of the representative buyer's program is given by:
In the following Proposition, we summarize the model's equilibrium. PROPOSITION 3: Under buyer's agency, there exists an equilibrium price p* ∈ [0,1]. This price satisfies:
A buyer accepts this price in period t if and only if v t ≥ δb + p*.
In theory, we could use the solution to (3.1) to define a function p*(α), which would identify the price that sellers demand as a function of α. Using this function, it would then be possible to analyze how the expected selling price of a house and the expected selling time of a house depend on the parameter α. Because sellers demand the same price in every period, regardless of the valuation of the buyer that they meet, the expected selling price of a house would simply be p*(α). The probability that the buyer and seller complete a transaction in any randomly chosen period would be q(α) = 1 -F(p*(α) + δb), while the expected number of periods that a house is on the market would be τ(α) = 1/q(α).
While it is possible in theory to solve equation (3.1) for a closed-form solution, in practice the solution is unwieldy for α > 0. Therefore, it is not feasible to investigate analytically how p*(⋅) and τ(⋅) depend on α.
Instead, we analyze the behavior of these functions numerically.
In Table 1 we present the equilibrium values of p* and τ for a range of different values of α. In these calculations we fix the discount factor δ = .998, a value that corresponds to weekly meetings between potential traders who have a yearly discount factor of approximately 0.9.
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18 We used Mathematica v.3.0.1 in order to perform the calculations that we summarize in the tables. While in the paper we present only the results that we obtain when δ = .998, we performed similar calculations for numerous discount factors ranging from zero to .999. These results were consistent with the results that we present here.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
The table tells a consistent story. As the expected buyer valuation in each match increases-as α increases-the equilibrium price of housing rises. This result is intuitive. Sellers naturally wish to capture part of any increase in buyers' willingness to pay, which they do by increasing the price that they demand. But sellers can also take advantage of an improvement in the distribution of buyer valuations to reduce the expected time that their houses will be on the market. Figure 2 illustrates that, as α rises, a representative seller expects to sell her house faster. Intuitively, a seller faces a tradeoff between the price that she receives and the expected time that her house will be on the market. When she faces a better distribution of buyers-buyers who are, on average, willing to pay more for her house-she can both increase the price that she receives and reduce the expected time that her house will be on the market. In equilibrium, she optimally balances this tradeoff.
The results that we present in Table 1 We illustrate the different possible effects of a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency in Table 2 . 19 Each cell of the table identifies how a switch to buyer's agency affects the expected price of housing (P) and the expected number of days required to sell a house (τ), as a function of the parameters z and α. Recall that z is the probability that a seller observes a buyer's valuation under seller's agency, while α reflects the extent to which a switch to buyer's agency improves a real estate agent's ability to match buyers with houses that they like. increase and the average time that houses spend on the market will fall.
On the other hand, if z is large, meaning that sellers are well-informed about buyers' valuations under seller's agency, then a switch to buyer's agency tends to cause the expected price of real estate to decrease and the expected time needed to sell a house to increase. For instance, suppose that z = .50, meaning that a seller observes a potential buyer's valuation with probability .50. Then even a significant improvement in the distribution of buyer valuations cannot overcome the downward pressure on the price of real estate and the probability of trade in each match that results from sellers' loss of information about buyer valuations.
Finally, it is possible that both the expected price of real estate and the expected time that it takes to sell a house will decline. Suppose, for instance, that z = .25. Then the expected price of real estate always falls after a switch to buyer's agency. On the other hand, the expected time that it takes to sell a house can either rise or fall;
it falls if α ≥ 0.5, i.e. if there is a sufficiently great improvement in the distribution of buyer valuations.
The results in Table 2 provide a framework that we can use to interpret the effects of a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency. Because we focus on how this institutional change affects two variables (the price of real estate and the expected time needed to sell a house), both of which could either increase or decrease, there are four different patterns of effects that we could potentially observe. In Table 3 we summarize the interpretation of each possible pattern of effects.
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
As Table 3 indicates, a finding that a shift to buyer's agency causes both real estate prices and the time needed to sell a house to rise would be inconsistent with, and would lead to a rejection of, the theoretical model.
To see why, recall that sellers face a tradeoff between the price that they receive and the expected time needed to sell their houses. If market conditions change in a way that is favorable to sellers, they have an incentive to mute the increase in the prices that they demand in order to speed the sales of their houses. In other words, sellers are willing to trade off some increase in the price that they receive in order to obtain a faster sale. But then an increase in the price of real estate that follows an improvement in the distribution of buyer valuations will be accompanied by a fall in the time needed to sell a house.
On the other hand, a finding that a shift to buyer's agency leads to a fall in the time needed to sell a house is consistent with the model, and it would provide evidence of an improvement in the distribution of buyer valuations in each match, i.e. evidence that α > 0. Such a finding would thus provide indirect evidence that a shift to buyer's agency improves the ability of real estate agents to match buyers with houses that they like. This conclusion has potentially significant implications for welfare under different agency regimes. If a shift to buyer's agency were to increase the speed at which buyers and sellers make deals with each other, it would reduce search costs and, thereby, promote efficiency.
Finally, a finding that a shift to buyer's agency leads to a fall in real estate prices would provide evidence that sellers do, in fact, receive valuable information about buyer valuations under the seller's agency regime.
When a change in the agency regime deprives sellers of this information, their ability to capture the gains from trade is diminished, and real estate prices consequently decline.
Of course, how the introduction of buyer's agency actually affects real estate prices and the expected time needed to sell a house is an empirical question. In the next section we explore this question by analyzing the effect of a change in Georgia real estate law that paved the way for the adoption of buyer's agency in that state.
Empirical Evidence
In this section, we develop a set of empirical results that help to illuminate how a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency affects both the overall efficiency of the real estate market and the distribution of the gains from trade in this market. The theory that we developed in the previous section provides us with a framework for using observed changes in real estate prices and the time needed to sell a house to assess how a switch to buyer's agency affects welfare. We now use the change in Georgia's real estate law that occurred on January 1, 1994, as a natural experiment for examining the impact of the introduction of buyer's agency on these variables.
As discussed in the introduction, the new law effectively introduced buyer's agency in Georgia. Interpreted in light of our theoretical results, our empirical results will permit us to judge whether or not the change in Georgia's law promoted efficiency.
There is no a priori reason to believe that all segments of the housing market would respond in the same way to a change in the prevailing agency relationships. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the market for relatively expensive high quality houses would react differently than the market for relatively inexpensive "starter homes." Obviously, the stakes involved in bargaining are much greater in the market for relatively expensive houses. Also, the market for relatively inexpensive houses may be "thicker" than the market for higher quality houses. In a very thick market there are many substitutes for each house and each potential buyer, and, therefore, each house may sell at a well-defined "market price." For both of these reasons, bargaining may be more important in the market for relatively expensive houses, and, therefore, legal changes that influence bargaining may have a greater effect on this market than on the market for less expensive houses. Our empirical analysis lends support to this conjecture.
Econometric Model
We estimate two equations. First, we use the hedonic price model to relate a house's sale price to (1) its physical characteristics, (2) market conditions at the time of the contract, and (3) characteristics of the house's location. In particular, we assume that equation (13) describes the ith house's real sale price at time t (where the real price equals the ith house's observed nominal sale price, p it , divided by the consumer price index for the month preceding the house's closing date, cpi t :
where H i is a vector of variables that describe the house's size and quality, M t is a vector of variables that describe the market conditions at the time that the parties to the sale sign the contract, and L i is a vector of variables that describe the characteristics of the house's location. The nominal sales price includes the real estate commission. 20 The β's are vectors of parameters; α 0 is the intercept parameter; and ε it is the residual error term.
Second, we use the hazard function to relate the time a house is on the market a similar set of variables that describe (1) the house's physical characteristics, (2) market conditions at the time of the contract, and (3) characteristics of the house's location. In particular, we estimate:
where T it is the length of time in days that a house was on the market on the day of closing; P it is the percentage of the time that the house is on the market that occurs after April 4, 1994; and η it is the residual error term.
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In an earlier paper we use the Chow breakpoint test to establish that April 1, 1994, is the appropriate date to assume that the new law became effective. 22 In this paper we use the Chow breakpoint test to test between 20 The mean commission rate for the houses sold in 1993 (before the introduction of buyer's agency) is 6.83%, with a standard deviation of 0.5625 (n = 3611). The mean commission rate for houses sold after the introduction of buyer's agency is 6.79% with a standard deviation of 0.6166 (n = 9003). While these two means are statistically different at the 1% level (t = -3.42), the difference is not economically significant. For instance, the difference in the commissions on a house selling for $250,000 is -$97.75. In 1993 the total commission on the sale of a house averaged at $17,077. Given that the commission must be split between two sets of real estate brokers and agents, the statistically significant reduction of the commission after 1993 is not large enough to have a plausible effect on the behavior of real estate agents.
21 P it equals 0 if the house was sold before the change in Georgia's real estate law. It equals 1 if the house was listed and sold after the change in Georgia's real estate law. It equals the fraction of the total time that the house was on the market that occurred after the law change for houses that were listed before the law change and sold after the law change. 22 Theory cannot predict exactly when the legal change would first affect sale prices. It is possible that buyers and sellers perfectly anticipated the impact of the law previous to January 1, 1994. A strong anticipation effect is unlikely, however, because buyers do not enter the housing market often enough to be familiar with upcoming changes in real estate law. In fact, one of the more important provisions of the new Georgia law is the requirement that agents disclose to all buyers the nature of the different agency relationships that buyers can choose. Because many of the houses that sold in late 1993 actually closed in January and February of 1994, it is more likely that several months passed before buyer's agency had an impact on housing prices. We also expect that the traditional thinness of the housing market during the first quarter of any year would slow the speed with which the new law would begin to affect the negotiations of buyers and sellers. The Chow breakpoint test allows us to identify if, and when, there is a significant change in the estimates of the parameters of Equation (13) between January 1, 1994, and June 1, 1994. Our results support the hypothesis that the parameter values of estimates of equations (13) and (14) for houses selling for less and $175,00 and those selling for $175,000 or more. The results of this test suggest that the regression parameters both for equation (13) and (14) for houses selling for a price greater than $175,000 are significantly different from the parameters for houses selling for less than $175,000
. 23 Next, we analyze the effect of this structural change by estimating the predicted change in the prices of houses with the median characteristics observed in 13 neighborhoods both for the relatively more expensive and the relatively less expensive houses. In all but one of these neighborhoods the predicted fall in prices after April 1, 1994, are significantly greater (in absolute size and as a percentage of the predicted preApril 1, 1994, price) for houses priced over $175,000 than they are for houses priced under $175,000. Finally, we find that the length of time it took to sell houses fell in the period after the change in the real estate law; moreover, our estimates indicate that the fall in the time that houses were on the market was larger for more expensive houses.
The Data
The housing data include 12,384 houses with a closing reported in the Atlanta Multiple Listing Service (MLS) during the period July of 1993 through June of 1995. The data are from the residential suburbs of northern Atlanta. 24 Since Equations (13) and (14) are in reduced-form, the covariates included should be Equation (13) variables that describe characteristics of the house that are exogenous either to the value of the house or to the time it takes to sell the house. The vector H i includes variables intended to measure the physical and quality characteristics of the house. We include the number of bedrooms (BEDS), the number of bathrooms (BATHS), their squares (BATHS2 and BEDS2), and their cross products (BEDBATH) as proxies for the size of the house. 25 The log of the age of the house, LAGE, measures the impact of the age of a house on the sales price.
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The last six variables -FIRE, HWAR, MULTI, SPLIT, COOL, and ZONED -are various measures of the quality of the house. Presumably, more fireplaces, the presence of air conditioning, and the presence of zoned air conditioning 27 will add to the value of the house and reduce the selling time. The presence of a home warranty on a house may be viewed by potential buyers as a positive or a negative attribute. A seller and buyer may use the home warranty as a risk sharing device. In this case, the presence of a home warranty may raise the final selling price and lower the selling time. On the other hand, the presence of a home warranty on a house for sale may be a signal to a buyer that the seller sees potential problems with the house. Since a buyer knows that the seller has an incentive to underinsure, the presence of a home warranty may actually lower the final sales price and increase the selling time. The two variables measuring the number of floors in a house -MULTI and SPLITare technically not measures of the quality of a house. The signs on these two variables depend on how purchasers value these characteristics and thus reflect consumer tastes. Economic theory cannot predict how these variables affect either the value of a house or the time it takes to sell the house.
We account for the temporal effects of market conditions on housing prices and selling times with the seven variables included in M t . The first two measure the impact of (1) the interest rate at the time of the signing of the contract and (2) expectations about the future path of interest rates on sales prices and time-on-the-market using the mortgage rate one month before the sale (INT1) and two months before the sale (INT2). This approach has the advantage of avoiding the problems that arise with the use of an estimated variable (expected interest rates)
as an explanatory variable in the estimation of Equation (13). However, because this method mixes the effects of current interest rates and expectations about future interest rates, we cannot isolate the effect on sales price or and time-on-the-market of changes in either of these two variables. We use unemployment rate (UNEM1 and UNEM2) and the wage levels (WAGE1 and WAGE2) in the Atlanta area for the two months previous to the month of the sale to measure the effect of aggregate demand on the sales price and time-on-the-market. Finally, we use a dummy variable (SUMMER) equal to one if the sale closed during the months of June, July, and
August. These months are traditionally periods of increased activity in the market because of the desire of many families to move during the summer vacation when the move will have a minimally disruptive effect on their children.
We use two sets of variables to measure the effect of the house's location on the sales price and time-on-themarket. The first set includes six variables that characterize the census tract in which the house is located: the population density of the census tract, the logarithm of the median income of the census tract, the percentage of the occupied homes that are owner-occupied, the percentage of the population over age 25 with a bachelor's degree or higher, the mean time to work, and the percentage of the population that is white. These data are from the 1990 Census. We expect that the lower population densities, higher median incomes, higher percentages of owner-occupied homes, higher percentages of college educated adults, shorter commuting times, and a higher percentage of whites will tend to raise final sale prices and lower the time a house is on the market.
In order to measure neighborhood effects that lie beyond the census tract but encompass an area less than the county, we include in our location variables a set of dummy variables for census tracts that the Bureau of Census groups together into "neighborhoods." Finally, we include a dummy variable for the county in which the house is located. In order to avoid multicollinearity, we omit dummy variables for at least one "neighborhood" in each county and the dummy variable for Gwinnett county.
Regression Estimation
Estimation of Equation (13) using ordinary least squares suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity in the model. Use of the White's heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates does not remove this heteroskedasticity. Thus, we adjust for the presence of heteroskedasticity by estimating Equation (13) using weighted-least squares, where the weights are determined via the method suggested by Harvey (1976) . 28 Moreover, we include the dummy variable SA to allow for differences in the slopes and the intercept terms of the regressions for the two periods.
The dummy variable SA is equal to one if the house closing occurs before April 1, 1994, and zero otherwise. We eliminate all of these interactive terms that are not significant at the 15 percent level in order to improve the precision of our estimates. Table 4 reports the results of the two weighted-least-squares estimations of Equation (13) for the two subsamples of the data. Columns (1) and (3) report estimations of Equation (13) with all of the non-interactive variables included while Columns (2) and (4) report estimations of Equation (13) with only the non-interactive variables that are statistically significant at the 15 percent level included. We use the regression results in
Columns (2) and (4) to calculate the predicted price changes reported in Table 5 ; we get substantially the same results using the parameters reported in Columns (1) and (3) to calculate the price changes.
In order to facilitate the interpretation of these parameter estimates, we use the two sets of parameter estimates reported in Table 4 to compute the predicted real sales price before and after April 1, 1994, for each of the thirteen neighborhoods in our sample. In computing these estimates we use the median values for the independent variables. Let X mi be the vector of median values of the matrix -that is, let,
, where i is an index indicating whether the house sold for more or less than $175,000. 29 Then, pairs of estimated real sale prices for each of the two price groups. 28 Harvey assumes that the model to be estimated is
. We can estimate the unknown parameters α by applying OLS to a regression of the log( ∃ u i 2 ) on z i, where ∃ u i 2 are the square of the residuals from the estimation of Equation (1). Harvey shows that the estimator is consistent if we subtract 1.2704 from the intercept term. See Harvey (1976) . The variables we include in z i are H i , LPDEN, LINCOME, and PBD. Table 6 reports the results of the estimation of this regression. Harvey, A. C. (1976) "Estimating Regression Models with Multiplicative Heteroscedasticity," Econometrica 44:461-465.
We report the results of these estimations in Table 5 along with their standard errors. 30 The estimates in Table 5 tell a fairly consistent story. The price changes for houses selling for under $175,000 are neither statistically nor economically significant. Moreover, for houses selling at a price of $175,000 or more, all but one of the neighborhoods exhibit a decrease in price. The decreases for ten of these twelve neighborhoods are significantly different from zero; all of the decreases are economically significant. The one neighborhood
showing an increase in the sales price for houses priced over $175,000 -Buford -has only ten observations in the sample, suggesting that the market for expensive houses in that neighborhood is too thin to draw any conclusions.
The estimation of Equation (14) uses much the same methodology as does the estimation of Equation (13).
We adjust for heteroskedasticity via the methodology suggested by Harvey (1976) . 31 Moreover, we include in Equation (14) the variable P it , the percentage of total time that the house is on the market that occurs after April 1, 1994. P it has the value of zero for houses listed and sold previous to April 1, 1994, and a value of one for houses both listed and sold after April 1, 1994. The coefficient for this variable allows us to measure the impact of the introduction of buyer's agency on the length of time that a house is one the market. A negative value for this parameter implies that houses tended to sell faster, everything else held constant, after the introduction of buyer's agency. Table 6 reports the values of this coefficient (1) when the estimation includes all houses, (2) when the estimation includes only houses with a real selling price greater than or equal to $175,000, and 30 We calculate the standard errors of the predicted price differences from the interactive terms reported in the right-hand-side of Table 9 . We write Equation (13), dropping subscripts, as: . Ω 22 is the variance-covariance matrix associated with the interactive variables. Clearly, ( (3) when the estimation includes only houses with a real selling price less than $175,000. 32 All three values are negative and highly significant, suggesting that houses spent significantly less time on the market after the change in Georgia's law.
Our theoretical model provides a framework that we can use to interpret these results. Consider the effect of the change in Georgia's real estate law on the market for relatively inexpensive houses. In this market, we find that the legal reform caused both real estate prices and the time that houses were on the market to fall, though the price effect was statistically insignificant. Using Table 3 to interpret these results, the slight fall in real estate prices leads us to conclude that the change in Georgia's law may have deprived sellers of at least some information about potential buyers' valuations. The fall in the time that houses were on the market leads us to conclude that, on average, buyers had higher valuations for the houses that their agents showed them after the legal change became effective. This finding is indirect evidence that the change in Georgia's law improved the ability of real estate agents to match buyers with houses that they like.
Now consider the effect of the change in Georgia's real estate law on the market for relatively expensive houses. In this market, we again find that the legal reform caused both real estate prices and the time that houses were on the market to fall. Furthermore, the price effect was quite large in this market. We interpret these results as evidence both that the legal change deprived sellers of a significant amount of information about the buyers' valuations and that real estate agents more effectively matched buyers with houses that they liked after the legal reform.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our empirical findings strongly suggest that a buyer's decision to use a buyer's agent improves his relative bargaining power in negotiations with sellers, particularly in the market for relatively expensive homes. It is not surprising that a shift to buyer's agency-and sellers' subsequent loss of information about buyer valuationshas the greatest impact on the "high-end" real estate market. Because relatively expensive houses are more 32 Table 6 reports the estimates of the coefficient estimates for P it for reasons of brevity. The full regression results are available from the authors.
highly differentiated than less expensive houses, information about the buyer's preferences is probably more valuable to sellers in the high-end market. Of course, a shift to buyer's agency may also influence bargaining in ways that are outside the scope of our model. For example, buyer's agents may play an active role in the negotiations between buyers and sellers and, because they are skillful negotiators, may be able to obtain more of the gains from trade for their clients than buyers would be able to extract if they negotiated on their own behalf.
This skill is more valuable in the market for relatively expensive homes, and therefore it is sensible to believe that agents who possess special bargaining skills would primarily serve that market.
Our empirical results help to identify how a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency affects welfare.
Consider the finding that the change in Georgia's real estate law caused the average time needed to sell a house to fall. This result suggests that a shift to buyer's agency lowers search costs in the real estate market. Clearly, such an effect would be welfare improving. Interpreted through the lens of our model, this finding is also evidence that a shift to buyer's agency improves the ability of real estate agents to match buyers with houses that they like and, thereby, increases the expected gains from trade in any meeting between a buyer and a seller. This effect would also be welfare improving.
Our empirical results provide evidence that some Georgia residents -those who owned relatively expensive homes -suffered a financial loss when the new agency law took effect. Nevertheless, the conclusion that sellers were hurt by the change in real estate law must be tempered by a recognition that many sellers are also buyers; a homeowner who sells his or her house typically buys another. Therefore, while some sellers' houses apparently lost value after the new law took effect, those sellers who buy another house in Georgia presumably benefit from the drop in prices brought about by buyer's agency. Sellers who purchased a relatively inexpensive house before the change in the law and now wish to "trade up" to a relatively expensive house should particularly benefit from the differential effect of the legal change in the different segments of the real estate market.
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It may seem that real estate agents suffered a loss when the new agency law took effect. Because agents' commissions are typically a fixed percentage of the sale price, anything that reduces real estate prices should also reduce commissions and possibly, in the long run, the number of real estate agents. This conclusion, however, is not consistent with lobbying by the National Association of Realtors and various state-level real estate associations to change real estate agency law in ways that favored the expansion of buyer's agency. Clearly, real estate agents believed that these legal changes would benefit them. The most plausible explanation for this belief is that the real estate industry viewed legal reform as the best way to reduce its vulnerability to large class action lawsuits such as Dismuke v. Edina Realty. Thus, the specter of costly litigation over real estate agents' duties to buyers and sellers created a demand for new laws that clarify these duties, even at the cost of smaller commissions. This explanation is appealing because it helps to explain why these legal changes did not occur sooner. If real estate prices, and hence commissions, are indeed lower under buyer's agency, then it clearly would not have been in the interest of the real estate industry to lobby for these changes until it became apparent that new laws were needed to reduce the threat of litigation.
This paper has attempted to illuminate how the prevailing agency relationship affects the price of housing and the expected time that is needed to sell a house. Further research is needed to explore the robustness of our conclusions that moving to a buyer's agency system leads to a significant drop in the price of relatively expensive homes but leads to little change in the price of relatively inexpensive houses, while reducing the time needed to sell houses in both markets. Ideally, researchers would study the effect of similar legal changes in other states.
Our theoretical and empirical results indicate that the nature of the relationship between intermediaries and buyers and sellers has an important effect on the equilibrium that arises in search markets. This conclusion raises the obvious question of what factors determine the nature of the socially optimal relationship between intermediaries and buyers and sellers. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to study more carefully how the different possible relationships between real estate agents and their clients affect allocative efficiency in the real estate market. In particular, it would be helpful to know, both theoretically and, if possible, empirically, how buyer's agency and seller's agency relationships influence both the aggregate gains from trade and aggregate search costs in the real estate market. This is an important question for future research.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) The seller's optimal pricing rule, say (v*,p*), satisfies the following necessary and sufficient conditions:
Rearranging (1.1) and substituting:
Rearranging (1.2) and substituting:
Define w* = p* + δB. Using the definitions of B and S and imposing a symmetric equilibrium, we have:
Using (1.3) -(1.5), we solve for w* and v*:
Together with the discussion in the text, (1.7) establishes the result.
(
Using (1.6), (1.8), and the fact that w* = p* + δB, we can solve p*:
Together with the discussion in the text, (1.9) establishes the result. QED
Proof of Proposition 2:
Straightforward (but tedious) differentiation establishes that dp*/dz = dP/dz > 0 when z ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) The probability that a transaction occurs in a match is ) ) (
Defining, w* = p + δB and using (1.6) and (1.7), ) 3 (
Straightforward differentiation establishes that dT/dz > 0 when z ∈ [0, 1]. QED
Proof of Proposition 3:
Define w* = p* + δB. Adding and subtracting δB from the left-hand side of (3.1),
we obtain: Rearranging equation (3.1), which is derived from the first-order condition for the seller's maximization problem, and substituting w* = p* + δB, we have )
. Because w* exists, p* consequently exists. QED P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .05 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .10 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .15 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ S,S P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .20 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .25 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .30 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .35 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .40 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .45 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .50 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .55 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .60 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .65 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .70 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .75 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .80 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .85 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .90 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ P↓,τ↑ .95 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ 1 P↑,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↓ P↓,τ↑ Legend:
(P↑,τ↓) = Expected price rises and expected time on the market falls after a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency.
(P↓,τ↓) = Expected price and expected time on the market both fall after a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency.
(P↓,τ↑) = Expected price falls and expected time on the market rises after a shift from seller's agency to buyer's agency. 
